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Reasoning About Obligations in Obligationes:
A Formal Approach
Sara L. Uckelman 1
Exzellenzcluster “Asia and Europe”
Ruprecht-Karls Universita¨t Heidelberg
Abstract
Despite the appearance of ‘obligation’ in their name, medieval obligational dispu-
tations between an Opponent and a Respondent seem to many to be unrelated to
deontic logic. However, given that some of the example disputations found in me-
dieval texts involve Respondent reasoning about his obligations within the context
of the disputation, it is clear that some sort of deontic reasoning is involved. In this
paper, we explain how the reasoning differs from that in ordinary basic deontic logic,
and define dynamic epistemic semantics within which the medieval obligations can
be expressed and the examples evaluated. Obligations in this framework are history-
based and closely connected to action, thus allowing for comparisons with, e.g., the
knowledge-based obligations of Pacuit, Parikh, and Cogan, and stit-theory. The con-
tributions of this paper are twofold: The introduction of a new type of obligation into
the deontic logic family, and an explanation of the precise deontic concepts involved
in obligationes.
Keywords: deontic logic, dynamic epistemic logic, obligation, obligationes, stit
1 Introduction
Deontic logicians who are interested in the history of their field may upon first
introduction to the medieval genre of disputationes de obligationibus think they
have found their ancestor: For what else could treatises on “disputations con-
cerning obligations” be about other than reasoning about obligation and per-
mission, i.e., deontic logic? Closer inspection of these disputations, however,
may lead the deontic logician to a place of puzzlement, for the example dispu-
tations which can be found in the treatises often have little or nothing to do
with obligation, permission, commitment, or any of the related notions which
make up the core of deontic logic. On an initial survey, it is unclear what the
obligation involved in these disputations is or how they are related to reason-
ing about deontic principles in general—if at all. In fact, many contemporary
scholars of obligationes explicitly disavow any connection between obligational
1 sara.uckelman@asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de
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disputations and deontic logic [18,19,25]. 2 Those who do take seriously the
notion of ‘obligation’ in terms of discursive commitments primarily focus on
how these obligations function at the meta-level of the disputation and dispu-
tational norms, [8,9,10,13,14,23]. To date, little work has been done on the
formal nature of the obligations involved in obligationes.
There are two participants in an obligational disputation, Opponent and
Respondent. 3 Opponent begins by putting forth (‘positing’) a proposition
which Respondent either admits or does not admit. (If he does not admit
it, then no disputation begins.) Propositions in the disputation are divided
into two types, relevant (pertinens) and irrelevant (impertinens). A proposi-
tion is relevant if either it or its negation is a logical consequence of the set
of propositions which have already been admitted (in the initial round of the
disputation) or conceded (in a later round of the disputation) along with the
negations of those denied, and it is irrelevant otherwise. The relevant proposi-
tions are typically further divided into those which are ‘relevant and following’
(pertinens sequens) and those which are ‘relevant and contradictory’ (pertinens
repugnans). The typical rule is that any relevant following proposition must
be conceded, any relevant contradictory proposition must be denied; and any
irrelevant proposition must be conceded if it is known to be true, denied if
known to be false, and doubted if neither (where doubting is taken as a neutral
action).
These disputations, so simple to describe, have nevertheless been a matter of
contention amongst contemporary scholars—and not just because it is unclear
what (if anything) the relation is between them and deontic logic. Another
puzzling feature of these disputations is that they often appear to be empty of
content [18]; the examples that occur in the medieval treatises do not involve
any substantive doctrinal issues. Instead, the propositions which appear in
many examples have a feeling of genericity to them: When Opponent puts
forward that Socrates is white or that Plato is black, or that Socrates and
Plato have the same color, it is clear that what is at stake is not the substantive
question of what color two ancient Greek philosophers were. Likewise, when
Respondent denies that a human being is a donkey or concedes that God exists,
he is not making a point about biology or theology. Instead, these propositions
are functioning as arbitrary contingent, impossible, and necessary propositions,
whose content is less important than their modal status.
But not all of the disputations are like this. In this paper we examine some
examples where the propositions put forward are not about Socrates, Plato,
2 [12] does not explicitly reject a connection, but does so implicitly by not mentioning obli-
gationes at all.
3 Because we do not have the space to go into the complexities of the historical situation,
we vastly oversimplify here. What we say here is true of the type of obligatio called positio
‘positing’, and of the rules for positio given by Walter Burley in his treatise on obligationes,
c.1302. Readers interested in the historical information are directed to [21,22] for further
information. In this paper, we present only those portions of the medieval theory which are
necessary to motivate the proposed formalization.
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donkey-humans, or God. Instead, the propositions Opponent posits have to do
with Respondent’s own responses, both the responses that he does make and
the responses he ought to make. This brings deontic reasoning directly into the
disputational framework, forcing Respondent to reason about his obligations
explicitly within the object language of the disputation.
2 Obligationes and deontic logic
In the brief description above of the rules that Respondent must follow when
responding to Opponent’s propositions, it is clear from the outset that there
are three different places where deontic concepts such as “must” or “ought to”
come in—one for each of the different types of actions Respondent can make.
What are these obligations rooted in? They arise when Respondent admits the
positum and thus binds himself to play by the rules. That is, they are generated
by his actions. This is true for the remainder of the disputation, in that it is his
actions which give rise to further obligations which he must abide by. In this,
the basic type of obligation that is involved in obligationes differs relevantly
from those in ordinary deontic logic. In the dominant approach to deontic
logic [2, p. 23], the operator ‘it is obligatory that’ attaches to propositions,
and no agent is specified, because it is expressed in the passive voice. (Such
approaches violate the Restricted Complement Thesis, which will appear below
in §4.) When Oϕ is asserted in a deontic logic context, there is no indication of
whose responsibility it is to see to it that ϕ is the case, or what actions can or
should be taken in order to meet the obligation. 4 In contrast, in an obligatio,
the obligation exists between an agent and an action.
Given this, there is a sense in which those who disavow any connection
between obligationes and deontic logic are right; it is certainly true no direct
comparison can be done. However, it is still possible to ask how these two types
of obligation, albeit different, compare to each other, and the answer sheds
interesting light on the question of what the obligation in an obligatio is. Boh
briefly considered this question in [5]. He offers the following formalization of
“the three most general constitutive rules of (the main type of) an obligational
disputation called positio” [5, p. 112]: 5
• ∀ϕ(Ka ϕ→ Oa Cϕ)
• ∀ϕ(Ka ¬ϕ→ Oa Nϕ)
• ∀ϕ((¬Ka ϕ ∧ ¬Ka ¬ϕ)→ Oa Dϕ)
According to Boh, “Rule (1) is read: for any proposition which is or might be
put forward in a disputation in which the person a takes part, if a knows that ϕ,
it is obligatory that he grants it. . . ‘O’, of course, represents the deontic operator
of obligation” [5, p. 112]. The other rules are to be understood analogously.
Unfortunately, inspection of the medieval texts will quickly show that these
4 Our use of “see to it that” here is not accidental. We discuss the relationship between our
approach and stit-theory in §6.
5 We have slightly adapted his notation to be consistent with the notation used in the current
paper (see Def. 4.1), as well as corrected errors in parentheses in the second two formulas.
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are untenable as correct formulations of the principle duties of Respondent in
positio. Virtually every author writing on this type of obligation points out
explicitly that it is only worthwhile to pursue a positio when the positum is
(known to be) false. Thus, Respondent upon admitting such a positum will
immediately violate (2), by admitting and conceding a proposition which is
known to be false. 6
Let us take a step back and ask a more general question: In what way are
the obligations in obligationes like the obligations in deontic logic? For a given
deontic logical language Ld, the minimal deontic logic is axiomatized by the
following schemata [24, p. 274]:
(i) All axiom schemata and rules of classical logic over Ld.
(ii) Oϕ ∧Oψ → O(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(iii) ¬O¬>
and the rule of inference:
ϕ⇒ ψ
Oϕ⇒ Oψ
If we interpret the O above as “ought to concede”, then the second schema
says that if Respondent ought to concede two conjuncts individually in their
own right, then he also ought to concede their conjunction. This is true in the
obligational setting only in certain cases. There are three possibilities: ϕ and
ψ are both relevant and following, ϕ and ψ are both irrelevant and known to be
true, and one of ϕ or ψ is relevant and following and the other is irrelevant and
known to be true. In the first two cases, if Respondent ought to concede ϕ and
he ought to concede ψ, then he also ought to concede ϕ∧ψ. However, the third
case fails. Suppose that Respondent ought to concede ϕ because it is relevant
and following, even though in reality it is known to be false. Suppose that
Respondent ought to concede ψ because it is irrelevant and known to be true.
Then consider ϕ ∧ ψ. The conjunction is neither relevant and following nor
relevant and contradictory, since in either case, ψ would then also be relevant.
Thus, ϕ ∧ ψ is irrelevant, and since ϕ is known to be false, the conjunction is
known to be false as well. As a result, not only is Respondent not obligated to
concede the conjunction, he is obligated to deny it. A similar story shows that
the rule of inference also fails. Suppose that ϕ→ ψ and Respondent ought to
concede ϕ. If he ought to concede ϕ because it is relevant and following, then it
is true he also ought to concede ψ, because whatever ϕ follows from, ψ follows
from as well, if ϕ → ψ. However, suppose ϕ is irrelevant, but known to be
true. If ψ is relevant in its own right, then it is true that Respondent ought to
concede ψ, independently of his obligations towards ϕ. But if ψ is irrelevant,
it is possible that ϕ → ψ but Respondent does not know that ψ is true. In
such a case, his obligation to ψ is to doubt it, not to concede it. (In such a
6 Burley gives an example which violates Boh’s reconstruction: “It should be said that
‘My hand is not closed’ must be denied even though it is true. And that is because it is
incompatible, since its opposite was previously granted” (earlier in the disputation) [7, 3.30].
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way, logical omniscience does not arise in obligationes, as noted by Uckelman
[21, p. 20].)
However, a modified version of this schema does hold: If Respondent has
in fact conceded ϕ, and likewise he has also conceded ψ, then it is true that
he ought to concede their conjunction: His previous actions have changed his
obligations with respect to ϕ ∧ ψ. This turns out to be the crucial insight
into understanding how the obligations in obligationes differ from the ones
in ordinary deontic logic. To state the (perhaps) obvious: Actions change
commitments. A person’s commitments in a given situation are influenced
both by what he does and what he knows. These obligations are, to borrow a
term from game-theory, history-dependent. (We discuss this further in §6.)
3 An example
Before we turn to the technical details, let us consider a concrete example, due
to Walter Burley. After he lists the rules for positio, Burley considers various
objections to these rules in the forms of sophisms, or logically problematic sen-
tences, where it appears that Respondent has no consistent way of responding
in a disputation beginning with such a sophism. The third objection to the
first rule 7 runs as follows:
Objection 3.1 Let this be posited: ‘You are in Rome or that you are in Rome
must be granted’. Next, let ‘That you are in Rome must be granted’ be proposed.
This is false and irrelevant; therefore it must be denied. Next, let ‘That you
are in Rome follows from the positum and the opposite of a proposition already
correctly denied’ be proposed. This is necessary, because this conditional is
necessary: ‘If either you are in Rome, or that you are in Rome must be granted,
but that you are in Rome is not to be granted, then you are in Rome.’ Once
this has been granted—‘That you are in Rome follows from the positum and the
opposite of a proposition already correctly denied’—let this be proposed: ‘That
you are in Rome must be granted’. If you grant this, you have granted and
denied the same thing; therefore [you have responded badly]. If you deny it, the
disputation is over; you have denied what follows according to a rule. Because
if the rule is good, this follows: ‘That you are in Rome follows from the positum
and the opposite of a proposition already correctly denied; therefore that you are
in Rome must be granted’ [7, 3.21].
This is presented as an objection to the rule because—if it is a correct descrip-
tion of how to proceed in such a case—it conflicts with the general principle
that a Respondent who follows the rules correctly will never be forced to con-
cede a contradiction. We briefly sketch in an informal fashion why one might
think the objection correctly describes how Respondent should proceed. The
7 The first rule is: “Everything that follows from the positum must be granted. Every-
thing that follows from the positum either together with an already granted proposition (or
propositions), or together with the opposite of a proposition (or the opposites of proposi-
tions) already correctly denied and known to be such, must be granted” [7, 3.15]. Different
translators use ‘granted’ and ‘conceded’ to translate Latin concedendum.
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positum takes the form of a disjunction, p∨ q, with the assumption being that
both disjuncts are false. 8 Next, one disjunct, q, is put forward. Neither p
nor q follow from p∨ q alone in the absence of other information (and we have
been provided with no such additional information), and q is, by assumption,
false. Thus, q should be denied. If q is denied, then p follows from this denial
along with the earlier concession of p ∨ q, by simple application of disjunctive
syllogism. But p∨ q is the positum, and if it is granted that p follows from this
along with the opposite of something correctly denied, namely q, this is tan-
tamount to saying that p ought to be granted—and this fact itself is q, which
was previously denied.
Three points should be noted. First, we reiterate what we said above about
the apparent contentless nature of the disputations. Whether Respondent is in
Rome is a matter of little import. 9 This example should be understood not as
an example of a specific dialogue, but of a template into which any contingent
falsehood whatever can be substituted in for “You are in Rome”.
Second, we equated the “opposite of something correctly denied” with that
proposition’s contradictory negation. This is not a problematic equation, but
nevertheless it is one that should be noted explicitly.
Third, when we equated the positum with a simple disjunction of the form
p∨q, this overlooked the internal structure of the two disjuncts, in particular the
fact that p occurs in the second disjunct as well. The only way that we can take
this internal structure into account is if we can express the notion of obligation
embedded in ‘must be granted’ and ‘must be denied’ within the object language
itself, not only in the metalanguage. Extending the ordinary object language of
obligationes so that it can handle cases like this one will shed light on the type
of obligation involved, and also how one can use the obligationes framework in
order to carry out (a certain limited type of) deontic reasoning. Because we
must first have the sophisticated framework in place before we can understand
how the example works, we defer discussion of Burley’s solution to the objection
to §5.
4 An abstract model for obligationes
In this section we define an abstract model, built on the framework defined in
[21] for Burley-style obligationes, within which specific examples, such as the
one above, can be analysed. The language is standard multi-agent dynamic
epistemic language, with two agents O(pponent) and R(espondent) and three
actions:
Definition 4.1 Let ϕn be a proposition put forward by O. R’s available ac-
8 Though it should be noted that the assumption is that Respondent is in fact not in Rome;
Burley wrote the treatise in Oxford, and thus he and his potential opponents and respondents
were located there as well.
9 See footnote 8.
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tions are C (for concedendo), N (for negando), and D (for dubitando):
Cϕn := [ϕn]>
Nϕn := [¬ϕn]>
Dϕn := [>]>
Well-formed formulas of this language are defined in the usual way, and
these formulas are interpreted on epistemic Kripke models, again as is standard.
We give only the semantics for the three actions. For an epistemic Kripke model
M, let
Mϕ = 〈WM,ϕ, {∼M,ϕa : a ∈ A}, VM,ϕ〉,
where WM,ϕ := {w ∈W : M, w  ϕ}, and the relations and valuation functions
are just restrictions of the originals. For an ordered set of propositions Γn, let
MΓn =Mγ0 . . . γn, that is, MΓn is the result of the sequential restriction
of M by the elements of Γn. Then:
Definition 4.2 M, w  [ϕ]ψ iff ∀v ∈Mϕ, v  ψ.
When Respondent announces “I concede ϕ”, the model is reduced to only
those worlds where ϕ is true, and when he announces “I deny ϕ”, the model is
reduced to only those worlds where ϕ is false. The action of doubt is strongly
agnostic: If Respondent is in doubt about a particular proposition, and he
announces this M> = M, i.e., nothing changes. Given these semantics, the
actions defined above can be understood as tests for consistency. If Respon-
dent’s actions are correct, then after his announcement there will be at least
one world left in the model. This captures the fact, noted by Burley himself,
that if Respondent responds according to the rules (which we define formally
below), then he will never be led into inconsistency, that is, into an empty
model.
From an abstract perspective, an obligational disputation can be seen as a
pair of sequences, one of propositions which are put forward by Opponent and
the other is the actions of Respondent 10 , along with a rule which indicates the
specific type of disputation the obligatio is.
Definition 4.3 An obligatio is a quadruple O = 〈Θ, R,ΓR,Γ〉 where
• Θ is a sequence of propositions, such that θ0 ∈ Θ is the initial proposition
and θn ∈ Θ is the proposition put forward by O at round n.
• R : Θ × N → Act is a function determining R’s correct response to each
element of Θ. We write R(θn) for R(θ, n) to simplify notation.
• ΓR is a sequence of elements from Act, formed by the correct response of R
to each element in Θ, as given by R. That is:
ΓR0 = 〈R(θ0)〉
ΓRn = 〈γ0, . . . , γn−1, R(θn)〉
Whether ΓR is unique depends on R.
10We could also view it as a single sequence, formed of these two sequences interleaved.
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• Γ is a sequence of elements from Act, formed by R’s actual responses to each
element of Θ.
Note that there are no constraints on Γ: In principle, Respondent is free
to respond in any fashion that he likes (so long as it is one of the actions
‘concede’, ‘deny’, or ‘doubt’). In practice, however, if Respondent’s responses
are not directed to the immediately preceding proposition of Opponent, then
it makes more sense to think of him not actually participating in an obligatio
disputation, rather than participating but failing wholly to play by the rules.
We do not add this as a formal constraint, but simply note that we do not
consider cases where Respondent acts in such a mulish, recalcitrant fashion.
We formalize Burley’s rules for positio, presented informally in §1, as follows:
Definition 4.4 For a model M and formula θ0 ∈ Θ:
RBur(θ0) =
{
C θ0 iff M, w  〈θ0〉>
N θ0 otherwise
For θn ∈ Θ, n > 0:
If MΓn−1  θn: RBur(θn) = C θn
If MΓn−1  ¬θn: RBur(θn) = N θn
Otherwise, let w∗ be the actual world, and:
If M, w∗  KR θn: RBur(θn) = C θn
If M, w∗  KR ¬θn: RBur(θn) = N θn
If M, w∗  ¬(KR θ ∨KR ¬θn): RBur(θn) = D θn
If Respondent denies θ0, then no obligatio begins. We represent this by
having him deny the positum, which has the effect of ‘canceling’ the model
and not allowing any further progress. Admitting the positum, which triggers
the start of the disputation, is equivalent in effect, if not exactly in action,
to conceding it. For an obligatio according to these rules, ΓR will always be
uniquely defined.
These rules provide the grounding for the obligations in the disputation.
Respondent is obliged to follow the rules, or risk the charge of having responded
badly, and hence ‘losing’ the disputation. Thus, Respondent’s obligations in a
positio according to the rule defined in Def. 4.4 are:
Definition 4.5 In an obligatio O at round n
• R ought to concede ϕ iff eitherMΓn−1  ϕ; orMΓn−1 2 ϕ, MΓn−1 2 ¬ϕ,
and M, w∗  KR ϕ.
• R ought to deny ϕ iff either MΓn−1  ¬ϕ; or MΓn−1 2 ϕ, MΓn−1 2 ¬ϕ,
and M, w∗  KR ¬ϕ.
• R ought to doubt ϕ iff MΓn−1 2 ϕ, MΓn−1 2 ¬ϕ, and M, w∗  ¬(KR ϕ ∨
KR ¬ϕ).
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w∗
O,R
w′
O,R
¬p p
Fig. 1.
These obligations provide us with the truth conditions for an object-
language obligation operator Oa ‘a ought to’ which can be applied to actions.
That is, our O operator satisfies the Restricted Complement Thesis [3, p. 787],
which requires that “the deontic constructions such as obligation, prohibition,
and permission must take agentives as their complements”. While only actions
can be obligatory (and not propositions), for any proposition, it is in prin-
ciple possible that Respondent be obliged to conceded, deny, or doubt that
proposition.
Definition 4.6 Fix an obligatio O and model M.
MΓn−1, w  OR Cϕn iff either MΓn−1  ϕ
or MΓn−1 2 ϕ, MΓn−1 2 ¬ϕ
and M, w∗  KR ϕ
MΓn−1, w  OR Nϕn iff either MΓn−1  ¬ϕ,
or MΓn−1 2 ϕ,MΓn−1 2 ¬ϕ
and M, w∗  KR ¬ϕ
MΓn−1, w  ORDϕn iff MΓn−1 2 ϕ, MΓn−1 2 ¬ϕ
and M, w∗  ¬(KR ϕ ∨KR ¬ϕ)
Note that the obligations are global: They do not depend on the world of
evaluation.
We are now in a position to formalize and evaluate the positio given in §3. Let
p :=‘R is in Rome’. Then, the positum θ0 = p ∨ OR C p, and the rest of Θ for
the positio is as follows:
θ1 := OR C p
θ2 := (θ0 ∧ ¬θ1)→ p
θ3 := OR C p
Consider the model in Figure 1, with two worlds, one where Respondent
is in Rome and one where he is not; the latter is the actual world, and both
participants know this.
Proposition 4.7 The positum θ0 = p ∨ OR C p is false at the actual world
because both disjuncts are false.
Proof. (1) M, w∗  ¬p. (2) M 2 p, because of w∗, and M 2 ¬p, because of
w′. M, w∗  ¬p, so M, w∗  ¬KR p. Hence, M 2 OR C p. 2
10 Reasoning About Obligations in Obligationes : A Formal Approach
However, the positum is not inconsistent (since w′  p), so Respondent is
correct in admitting it, and the resulting model Mθ0 is displayed in Figure 2.
w′
O,R
p
Fig. 2. Mθ0
Opponent then posits OR C p. Immediately we can see where the objection
Burley considers has gone wrong. The objection says that OR C p “is false and
irrelevant; therefore it must be denied”. However, once p ∨ OR C p has been
admitted, OR C p is no longer irrelevant. The only situations where Respondent
ought to concede p are cases where either p is true in all remaining worlds of
the model or where p is known at the actual world. Because we start from the
assumption that p is false at the actual world, it cannot be known there, which
means that after conceding θ0, the only worlds that remain are worlds which
were retained because they made p true. Hence, whatever the initial model was
like, after conceding p ∨OR C p, OR C p becomes relevant. Thus, the objection
fails at round 1.
5 Burley’s solution
It is of course interesting that we are able to use our formalization to identify
a problem with the objection. But the only way this will go beyond merely
interesting is if the problem that we have identified is the same problem that
Burley identifies; and if not, does it tell us something about the problem he
identifies? This is one test of the adequacy of the framework. It turns out that
Burley solves the objection differently than we did in the previous section, in
the following way:
Solution 5.1 (To Objection 3.1) This must be denied: ‘That you are in
Rome follows from the positum and the opposite of a proposition correctly de-
nied’; it is not necessary either. Even if it is necessary that from the posited
disjunction together with the opposite of one disjunct it follows that you are in
Rome, it is nonetheless not necessary that the disjunction be posited [7, 3.22].
Few modern commentators have discussed either the objection or this re-
sponse to it, and those who have find it puzzling. Stump says that this solution
to the problem “looks bizarre”, and that:
On the face of it, then, Burley is saying that [θ2] is to be denied because it is
not necessary, and his reason for claiming that [θ2] is not necessary is that one
of the premisses it is derived from, namely, [θ0] is not necessary [20, p. 324].
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But Stump is correct in noting that “there is no obligational rule to the effect
that we must deny any propositions which are not necessary” [20, p. 324], and
this is clearly not what Burley is arguing here. One way to understand what
he is saying is to look at another objection and response that he presents, since
the second response makes much the same point:
Objection 5.2 Let this be posited: ‘Nothing is posited to you.’ Next, let ‘Ev-
erything that follows from the positum must be granted’ be proposed. This must
be granted because it is a rule. Next, let ‘Something follows from the positum’
be proposed. This follows and therefore must be granted. Next, let ‘Something
is posited’ be proposed. If you grant this, you grant the opposite of the positum;
therefore, [you have responded] badly. If you deny it, you deny something that
follows, because this follows: ‘Something follows from the positum; therefore
something is posited’ [7, 3.17].
Solution 5.3 (To Objection 5.2) One says that this must be denied: ‘Ev-
erything that follows from the positum must be granted’; it is not necessary
either. But this is necessary: If something follows from the positum, it must be
granted [7, 3.19].
In both solutions, Burley identifies a proposition in the disputation which Re-
spondent had conceded but which in fact he ought to have denied, and justifies
this fact by an appeal to a lack of necessity. Stump offers a different interpreta-
tion of the solution to Objection 3.1 on which “an unintelligible solution [turns]
into an intelligible red herring” [20, p. 325]. When Burley says “ ‘That you are
in Rome’ follows from the positum and the opposite of a proposition correctly
denied” must be denied, Stump argues that Burley takes an “extreme” [20,
p. 327] stance with respect to the phrase ‘the positum’, treating it as ambigu-
ous because it may refer to the positum in the disputation at hand, or it may
refer to any other potential positum. Thus, when Burley says “it is not nec-
essary that the disjunct be posited either”, he is pointing out that if another
proposition had been the positum—which is perfectly reasonable—then none
of the other propositions put forward would follow. This interpretation is bol-
stered by Burley’s solution to yet another objection (which we do not discuss),
in which he makes a distinction between “You have denied something that fol-
lows from the positum, therefore [you have responded] badly” and “You have
denied something that follows from what was posited to you, therefore [you
have responded] badly” [7, 3.20]. The only way that these can differ is if ‘the
positum’ can be interpreted more generically than ‘what was in fact posited to
you’. 11
There are two ways to react to this interpretation. On the one hand, calling
this a red herring may not be incorrect, since on this interpretation the solu-
tion doesn’t appear to address the issue we identified in the previous section,
namely, that given the relationship between admittance and concession, once
11 It is worth remembering here that Latin does not have definite or indefinite articles, and
that occurrences of ‘the positum’ are better read as simply ‘positum’ without any article.
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the positum of Objection 3.1 has been admitted, the second disjunct becomes
relevant. 12 On the other hand, calling it a mere red herring is dismissive,
implying that what Burley is demonstrating here is in some sense beside the
point. But this is not the case. In fact, what Burley is pointing out in each of
the three solutions is a genuine feature of obligational disputations—namely,
that until the positum is admitted, no obligation exists. The rules themselves
that Respondent can bind himself to follow are not themselves necessary. They
are not encoded in the models, and while Respondent ought to follow the rules,
he is not forced to, because sometimes he can make mistakes. What Burley
is pointing out is the fact that Respondent is not under obligation until he
admits the positum; only after that does it become necessary that he grant
whatever it is that does in fact follow from what was posited to him initially.
It is precisely that the obligations can be violated—that they are weaker than
necessity—which our approach illustrates so clearly. Thus, while the primary
problem with the objections that our framework identifies is not the one Burley
identifies, our model nevertheless sheds light on the solutions he does give, and
provides an explanation which has hitherto been elusive.
6 Comparison with related work
In §2 we briefly explained how the axioms and inference rule of the minimal
deontic logic fail to obtain in the context of obligational reasoning. In this
section, we compare what we have introduced above to two other well-known
approaches which combine action and obligation, knowledge-based obligations
and stit-theory.
6.1 Knowledge-based obligations
In [15], Pacuit, Parikh, and Cogan (PPC) introduce a semantics for knowledge-
based obligations which model the interaction between knowledge and obliga-
tion in history-based models such as those of [16,17]. These obligations bear a
strong resemblance to the obligations in obligationes, and in fact much of what
we developed above was inspired by the PPC approach. Nevertheless, there
are some important differences, which we highlight.
PPC models are composed of sets of events indexed to each agent, and a set
of all global possible histories of these event-sets. Obligations in these models
are expressed by the introduction of a value function for histories which assigns
a real number to each global infinite history such that higher-valued histories
are considered ‘better’ than lower-valued ones [15, p. 321]. An agent is then
obliged to perform a certain action at a certain time if any maximal extension
of the agent’s local history is one where that action is considered ‘good’ [15,
Def. 4.2].
The first difference is conceptual. The goal of [15] was to explain how the
creation of new knowledge can engender obligations for an agent that he did
not previously have—that is what makes the obligations of PPC knowledge-
12Stump ultimately recognizes this fact [20, p. 326].
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based. In our case, we also want to represent a type of dependency but it is
based on action rather than knowledge. We could say that the obligations in
obligationes are knowledge-based, but the knowledge is rooted in the actions
of Respondent. Thus, the dependency on knowledge is only derivative; the
dependency on action is primary.
The second is structural, relating to the shape of the models. History-based
models are Kripke frames built from a set of events which are organized into se-
quences, linear histories which themselves make up a branching structure. The
models distinguish between local (agent-indexed) histories and global (agent-
indifferent) histories, and there is a global clock which is used to keep the
histories synchronous. In our framework, there is no history parameter which
is internal to the model. There is no temporal reasoning or actions which hap-
pen within a given model; all of the action happens at the level of transitioning
from one model to another, via the public concession, denial, and doubting of
propositions by Respondent. These transitions are tracked at the level of the
obligatio, with the parameter Γ, rather than at the level of the model that the
obligatio is evaluated against. If we consider the sequence of models that a
particular Γ gives rise to as forming the history of the disputation in which
Respondent’s obligations are grounded, then it is clear that we do not have to
distinguish between local histories and global histories, because both partici-
pants are aware of every move made in the disputation; there is no uncertainty
as to whether, e.g., Opponent put forward a certain proposition, or whether
Respondent conceded it. By keeping the ‘histories’ separate from the models,
we are easily able to explain what grounds the high value of ΓR, which by
definition (Def. 4.3) is the history which follows the rules R.
Additionally, doing this obviates the need for a global clock: Each move in
the disputation functions as a ‘clock tick’, in one sense. The fact that the ‘clock’
is external to the model reflects one of the structural properties of obligationes
which we haven’t otherwise discussed in this paper, namely, the often-stated
rule that “all responses must be directed to the same instant” [7, 3.84]. That
is, the determination of the correct action for irrelevant propositions should be
done with respect to a single, fixed moment—in our set-up, the actual world in
the initial model—so as to prevent Respondent from being forced to concede
“Opponent is sitting” put forward while Opponent is in fact sitting, but then
having to deny it when Opponent is no longer sitting.
6.2 stit-theory
Since its introduction in [4], the ‘seeing to it that’ approach to agency has
proven a rich source of tools for reasoning about agency and action. It is no
surprise that many people have used different flavors of stit-operators to define
various explicit obligation operators. We survey only a few of these approaches
here and do not make any claim to completeness.
Similar to the PPC approach, in branching stit frames obligations are gen-
erally expressed by the addition of an Ought function which maps each moment
m to a subset of H(m), the set of histories containing m. More fine-grained
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notions of obligation can be expressed by placing valuations on the histories, al-
lowing histories to be compared to each other as being better or worse. Deontic
operators defined in these ways lie between historical necessity and historical
possibility [11, p. 616], that is, if it is necessary for Respondent to concede ϕ,
then he ought to concede ϕ; and if he ought to concede ϕ, then it is possible
for him to concede ϕ. In another approach ([6], adapted from [1]), “an agent is
obliged to do something if and only if by not doing it, it performs a violation”
[6, p. 55]. This informal description of obligation is consistent with the concep-
tion of obligation in obligationes, whereby Respondent is required to do that
which will keep him from responding badly. Formally, the obligation operator
is defined as follows:
O[axstit]ϕ := (¬[axstit]ϕ→ [axstit]V )
where V is a violation.
Belnap sees stit-theory as “a powerful alternative to two different programs”.
The first program we already saw in §2, and relates a deontic operator to a
proposition. The second relates deontic operators to actions. Belnap criticizes
this approach because it “does not offer us a logical point of view from which
it is easy and natural to see that obligation, etc., can in fact make at least
subordinate reference to declaratives” [2, p. 23]. He says that stit :
make[s] it easy to see that obligation must take an imperative, and also easy
to see the important truth that any declarative whatsoever can give rise to
an imperative [2, p. 23].
The same can be said of the actions and obligations in obligationes: Since
Opponent can put forward any sentence whatsoever, not only can any declar-
ative give rise to an imperative, any (well-formed within the language) im-
perative can as well! Not only can Opponent put forward ϕ, giving rise to
ORXϕ for X ∈ {C,N,D}, but he can also put forward ORXϕ, giving rise to
ORX(ORXϕ).
Nevertheless, conceptually there is a large difference between obligations in
stit-theory and obligations in obligationes, and that is that stit-theory, despite
being about imperatives rather than declaratives, is still oriented towards the
resulting proposition, not towards the action which causes the result. To put
it simply, Rstitϕ encodes an arbitrary action with a definite outcome—the
sentence says nothing about what action R must take in order to see to it that
ϕ is true, only that ϕ’s being true must result, if the stit sentence is true. In an
obligatio, on the other hand, Cϕ encodes an arbitrary outcome with a definite
action—this sentence says nothing about what the result is, only what action
Respondent must take. Given his preceding actions, at each round there is
a definite action which Respondent is obligated to perform, regardless of the
consequences performing that action might have.
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7 Conclusion
Historically, many people have disavowed any connection between the medieval
genre of obligationes and deontic logic in general. What we have shown here is
that on the contrary, the obligational setting provides an interesting framework
for reasoning about dialectical obligations in an agent-directed rather than a
proposition-directed way. The approach has features in common with both
knowledge-based obligations of PPC and with various types of obligations de-
veloped in conjunction with stit, but differs from both in important ways by
focusing on the specific actions which give rise to the obligations. Thus, even
if it were stripped of its medieval trappings, the present framework provides an
interesting starting point for further exciting investigations.
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